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Smoker blames cancer related death on manufacturer
By J. David Gorin

In Grinnell v. American Tobacco Co., 883 S.W.2d
791 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), the Texas Court of Appeals
reversed a trial court's decision to dismiss a variety of
state and federal claims brought by the survivors of a
smoker against a tobacco manufacturer. It found that
state law claims against a cigarette manufacturer were
not preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act ("Labeling Act"). Furthermore, the
court held that a manufacturer was not excused from its
duty to warn consumers of dangers associated with
cigarette smoking in instances where such dangers and
hazards were not common knowledge.

Trial court dismisses all claims
In July 1985, physicians diagnosed Wiley Grinnell,
Jr. with lung cancer. In October of that year, he and his
wife brought suit against the American Tobacco Company ("ATC") for personal injuries and damages

suffered by Grinnell as a result of smoking cigarettes
designed, manufactured, marketed, and sold by the
defendant. In April 1986, ATC deposed Grinnell for trial.
He subsequently died later that year. Early the following
year, Grinnell's wife, parents, and son filed an amended
petition and were added as plaintiffs (hereafter collectively referred to as "Grinnell") in the suit. The amended
complaint sought actual and punitive damages under the
Texas Wrongful Death Act, the Texas Survival Statute,
and several additional theories, including strict liability,
negligence, and misrepresentation involving relevant
state and federal provisions.
In May 1987, the trial court granted ATC partial
summary judgment, dismissing Grinnell's claims
challenging both the adequacy of a congressional statute
pertaining to cigarette packaging and the propriety of
ATC's advertising and promotional practices from
January 1, 1966. The court granted a second motion for
partial summary judgment for ATC in April 1989,
Please see "Court recognizes... "on page 116

Seller failed to disclose cancellation rights
Continuedfrom page 114

The court found this language to be
insufficient to amount to a proper
refund policy.

Contract void
The court held that, notwithstanding Rossi's statutory right to rescind
under the PPL, her contract with
Royal Prestige was unconscionable
because of Royal Prestige's gross
misrepresentations and the exorbitant price it charged for the Health
System

Seller violated New York's
General Business Law
New York's General Business
Law Section 349 ("GBL") forbids
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business practices which are: (1)
materially deceptive or misleading;
and (2) the proximate cause of
injury to the plaintiff. The GBL does
not require the plaintiff to show
intent, recklessness, or fraud.
Similarly, the plaintiff need not
show reliance on the defendant's
actions.
The court ruled that Royal
Prestige's failure to disclose Rossi's
cancellation and refund rights,
pursuant to the PPL, constituted an
unfair business practice under the
GBL. Further, its dubious assertions
regarding the nutritional value of
food cooked by the Health System
and the Health System's ability to
fight heart disease and produce
healthier babies were misleading
and deceptive. Finally, the court held
A

that the inducements Kieffer used to
persuade Rossi to meet with him
were also misleading and deceptive.
Kieffer never delivered 99 of the
100 free rolls of film he promised.
Moreover, the discount vacation did
not live up to its billing because of
its poor quality and location.

Court awards damages
and costs to consumer
The court awarded Rossi the full
amount of the contract price,
including taxes and shipping costs;
$100 for Royal Prestige's refusal to
refund the contract price; $1000 for
Royal Prestige's violation of GBL;
and $344.66 in attorneys fees and
costs.

w
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Court recognizes presumption against preemption
Continuedfrom page 115

dismissing Grinnell's claims that
arose as post-1965 claims. Neither
of these partial judgments were final
nor appealable. However, in January
1993, the trial court granted the
tobacco company's renewed motion
for summary judgment, dismissing
all of Grinnell's claims. Plaintiffs
then appealed the court's grant of
full summary judgment to the Court
of Appeals of Texas.

Grinnell attributes
injuries to ATC
On appeal, Grinnell raised a
number of issues related to their
federal and state claims. First, they
contended that the trial court erred
in granting ATC's motions for
partial summary judgment against
their claims challenging the adequacy of the congressionallymandated warnings placed on
cigarette packages under the
Labeling Act as well as the propriety
of the tobacco company's promotional practices.
In response, ATC contended that
Grinnell's claims regarding ATC's
labeling and advertising of its
tobacco product were preempted by
the Labeling Act. It argued that the
federal statute expressly mandated
that a particular type of warning
must be used on cigarette packages.
Furthermore, ATC contended that
the states were prohibited from
requiring any additional warnings
related to the health risks associated
with smoking from cigarette
manufacturers.

Defendant cites Cipollone
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ATC relied heavily on Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct.

2608 (1992), for support of its
position. In Cipollone, the plaintiff,
a smoker of many years, alleged that
she developed lung cancer from
smoking cigarettes that had been
designed, manufactured and sold by
three different defendants. The
Cipollone defendants claimed that
they were protected from all liability
associated with their products after
1965 by the Labeling Act and its
successor, the Public Health and
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
("Smoking Act").
On review, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Cipollone held that the
Labeling Act did not preempt state
law damages actions. The Court did
find that the Smoking Act preempted claims based on a failure to
warn and the neutralization of
federally mandated warnings if such
claims relied on omissions or
inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotions. It did not,
however, preempt claims based on
express warranty, intentional fraud
and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.

Appellate court finds
federal preemption
Applying the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Cipollone to the
present case, the Court of Appeals of
Texas held that the Smoking Act
preempted Grinnell's claims
involving failure to warn and
fraudulent misrepresentation that
neutralized federally mandated
warnings. However, it held that
neither the Labeling Act nor the

Smoking Act preempted Grinnell's
claims based on express warranty,
intentional fraud and misrepresentation, and conspiracy.
In making this determination, the
appellate court recognized the basic
presumption against preemption. It
suggested that state police powers
are not to be superseded by federal
legislation unless there exists a clear
and manifest purpose for the
congressional act. Accordingly, the
court concluded that the Labeling
Act did not reflect a clear, manifest
and unambiguous congressional
intent to preempt state common law
claims for injuries, damages, or
death suffered as a result of smoking
cigarettes.
More specifically, the court found
that neither federal statute preempted the following causes of
action: strict liability claims for
defective design and defective
manufacture of cigarettes and failure
to warn, express warranty and
implied warranty claims, and claims
based on misrepresentation,
negligence, and civil conspiracy.
The court recognized that preemption did, however, apply to a limited
classes of claims based on the
failure to warn. Because such
exceptions to federal preemption
existed, the appellate court held that
the partial summary judgment orders
granted by the trial court were
erroneous as ATC failed to establish
that it was entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.

Where tobacco products
were reasonably safe?
Continued on next page
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Cigarette manufacturer is not liable as a matter of law
Continuedfrom previous page

Grinnell next argued that the trial
court erred in granting ATC summary judgment on a variety of state
law issues relating to its manufacture, sale, and distribution of
tobacco products. These state-law
theories included strict liability,
negligence, fraud, civil conspiracy,
and ultrahazardous activity. ATC
contended that specific products,
such as tobacco, were neither
defective nor unreasonably dangerous to the consumer as a matter of
law. Moreover, the defendant argued
that it owed no duty to warn the
consumer of ordinary and commonly known dangers associated
with its product.
As a result, ATC claimed that it
was entitled to summary judgment
on these claims. In its review of
whether the tobacco products in
question were defective or unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law,
the appellate court examined various
reports, letters, and other evidence
from the trial record. Although the
court agreed that while good tobacco
without any additives or foreign
substances may not be unreasonably
dangerous, tobacco containing
additional carcinogens, additives, or
tar may be. It concluded from the
evidence that ATC used or experimented with the fumigation of
certain Turkish tobaccos, thus
raising the issue of whether the
cigarette products were reasonably
safe and not defective. Moreover,
the court also noted that the nicotine
contained in cigarettes is highly
addictive. Taken together, the
appellate court held that ATC had
not established that the cigarettes in
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question were neither defective nor
unreasonably dangerous as a matter
of law.

Doctrine of common
knowledge does not apply
The court then turned to the issue
of whether ATC had a duty to warn
its consumers of the dangers
associated with smoking its tobacco
products. When concluding that
these dangers were not common
knowledge at the time Grinnell
began smoking and developed an
addiction to cigarettes, the court first
relied on Grinnell's own statement
that he had neither seen nor heard
anything about any risk of lung
cancer associated with smoking
cigarettes.
Second, it similarly considered
Grinnell's testimony that he had read
advertisements by ATC stating that
there was no evidence or proof that
cigarette smoking caused lung
cancer.
Third, the court found that
advertisements made by ATC during
the period when Grinnell was a
consumer suggested that its cigarettes were "friendly to your taste,"
and thus, created express and
implied warranties that the product
was harmless.
Finally, the court reviewed
evidence suggesting that ATC
attempted to discredit the research
and warnings of the American
Cancer Society regarding the health
risks of smoking. Citing in-court
testimony, memoranda, and statements from the executives of ATC, it
found that ATC was aware that small
amounts of arsenic appeared in its

product, recognized its danger, knew
of the campaign to make smokers
aware of the dangers related with
cigarette smoking, and attempted to
curtail the fears of consumers by
stressing the safety of their product.
Further, it found that ATC engaged
in a misinformation campaign to
assure the pubic that their products
were not dangerous.
Taken together, the court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that Grinnell did not possess
the common knowledge as to the
dangers of smoking required to
excuse ATC from its duty to warn.
As a result, it held that the defendant
had failed to meet its burden of
establishing that no genuine issue of
material fact existed as a matter of
law.

Cigarette manufacturer is
not liable as a matter of
law for injuries
Finally, the appellate court
addressed the issue of whether ATC,
as a manufacturer of cigarettes, was
liable as a matter of law for
Grinnell's injuries. The plaintiffs
contended that ATC should be liable
for damages as it was undisputed
that cigarettes cause cancer and are
unfit for human consumption. The
court held, however, that the trial
court had not erred by denying
Grinnell's motion for summary
judgment as the issue was not
beyond dispute.
The appellate court thus remanded the case back to the trial
court for further consideration on the
merits.
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Court decides common law claim should survive
Continuedfor page 114

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety
standard established under this subchapter is in
effect, no State or political subdivision of a State
shall have any authority either to establish, or to
continue in effect, with respect to any motor
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any
safety standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal
standard. Nothing in this section shall be
construed as preventing any State from enforcing
any safety standard which is identical to a
Federal safety standard.
The Savings Clause of the Safety Act, however,
provides that compliance with the regulation "does not
exempt [one] from any liability under common law."
The Supreme Court of Arizona stated that the Supremacy Clause allows Congress to promulgate laws
and federal regulations that supersede state law. The
court noted, however, that there is a presumption that the
historic police powers of the States are not preempted by
a federal law unless Congress clearly manifests such an
intent. The most reliable source of congressional intent
is the language of the statute itself. The court found the
text of the Safety Act clear and unambiguous. The court
concluded that, reading the Preemption and Savings
Clauses together as a whole, "state regulation [which]
conflicts with the Safety Act is prohibited, but state
common law tort claims are saved and survive."
Additionally, the court noted and adopted the test
established in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which
limits the preemptive reach of a federal statute to its
express terms and makes it inappropriate for a court to
search for unarticulated congressional intent which may
result in implied preemption.
Before the Cipollone decision, the federal courts
ruled that the Safety Act impliedly preempted common
law tort claims, even though the preemption clause did
not expressly preempt such claims. However, as a result
of Cipollone, the courts have narrowed the evaluation of
a statute's preemptive reach to its express terms. The
Supreme Court of Arizona reasoned that the Cipollone
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test was the best policy because it commands courts to
follow the textual path of the statute to determine its
preemptive reach and eliminates a search for unexpressed congressional intent. The court further reasoned
that if Congress intended to preempt, it would use the
language necessary to accomplish that result.

Safety Act does not preempt common law
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the Safety
Act does not preempt state common law actions. The
court reasoned that the Cipollone test was applicable in
this case because the text of the Safety Act's preemption
clause only addressed regulatory standards and did not
reach or include state common law tort claims. The
preemption clause only prohibits states from mandating
safety standards which differ from those mandated by
the Safety Act. Furthermore, the purpose of the Savings
Clause was to ensure that the Safety Act would not
preempt state common law. The court construed the
Savings and Preemption Clauses together. The court
came to the "inescapable conclusion" that Congress
considered the preemption of state law causes of action
and rejected it. Consequently, an automobile manufacturer can be liable for a state tort action for defective
design, even if the design complies with the Safety Act
standards.
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